Identity Trust
Is the identity and evidence trustworthy within the method/source scope?
A regulated organisation must be able to trust not only an identity result but also how the service is operated, changed, supported and recovered.
Identity · Evidence · Technical · Service
Is the identity and evidence trustworthy within the method/source scope?
Can the result be traced to transaction, provenance, method and limitations?
Are security architecture, certificates, platform controls and attack boundaries evidence-backed?
Are availability, incidents, support, change, continuity and responsibility transparent?
Technical certification does not replace SLA, incident process or business continuity.
The website publishes public principles and evidence; specific SLA/NFR values remain in contractual documents where applicable.
Public disclosure is separate from contractual commitments.
| Domain | Question | Evidence source |
|---|---|---|
| Availability | How is service availability managed? | Service architecture / SLA |
| Incident | Who communicates, classifies and recovers? | Incident process / support agreement |
| Change | How are API/service changes governed? | Version/deprecation/release governance |
| Continuity | Where are continuity/DR obligations defined? | NFR/BCP/contract |
| Support | Which channel/escalation path applies? | Support agreement |
| Reporting | Which operational/evidence reports are available? | Service operations source |