Document profile
Before calling a document authentic, the system needs a document type/profile and acquisition method. Optical imagery, MRZ/barcode, chip/eID and authoritative-source data have different trust properties.
PLATFORM · CHECKID
Document Trust
Document, chip-data, validity and issuer-trust verification chain.
CAPABILITYInput → Processing → Output
CONTROLPolicy · risk · standard
EVIDENCEResult · trace · scope
TECHNICAL REFERENCE
Document trust: from readable data to trusted source
Capture → profile → extraction → integrity/authenticity → issuer/source → holder binding → evidence
Extraction is not authenticity
OCR or machine-readable field extraction shows that data was read; it does not by itself establish document authenticity. Authenticity requires security-feature, chip/signature or source validation appropriate to the document.
Consistency
Cross-field consistency can identify discrepancies among visible data, MRZ/chip or source records where supported. A consistency check is not equivalent to issuer validation.
Chip/eID
For chip-enabled documents, integrity and trust follow the relevant protocol/PKI. ICAO eMRTD logic is not applied to every national eID.
Holder binding
Document trust evaluates the evidence/document; holder binding evaluates whether the presenter is the corresponding subject. They remain separate in architecture and evidence.
Outcome
Where the contract permits, outcomes should distinguish read/extract success, integrity/source result, holder result and final policy decision rather than collapsing everything into “verified”.