Access
Chip access depends on the document profile and corresponding access data/protocol. BAC/PACE are not claimed for every eID.
PLATFORM · CHECKID
NFC & eID
Read contactless chips, validate integrity and support mobile/reader journeys.
CAPABILITYInput → Processing → Output
CONTROLPolicy · risk · standard
EVIDENCEResult · trace · scope
DOCUMENT TRUST
Document / chip → integrity → holder → evidence
ePassport/eMRTD/ICAO Doc 9303 is separated from national-ID/eID profiles; each applies only within its scope.
DocumentePassport / eID / CCCD context
→
NFC / MRZcapture channel
→
Chip trustPA / certificate / SOD where applicable
→
Holderbiometric binding
→
EvidenceResult · audit
SOURCE-BOUND REFERENCE
NFC/eID: chip reading is only one layer of document trust
Source → Scope → Evidence → Limitation
Secure messaging
After access establishment, secure messaging protects exchange where the profile/protocol supports it; unsourced cryptographic steps are not claimed.
Data
Chip data/Data Groups are interpreted by the correct document profile; ICAO ePassport and Vietnamese CCCD/eID are not treated as the same profile.
Trust
A successful read does not itself prove issuer trust. Signed-data/certificate/source validation remains a separate step where applicable.
Holder
Chip/document trust does not prove the presenter is the holder; holder binding requires biometric or another configured method.
Evidence
Results distinguish read/access failure, integrity/authenticity outcome and holder outcome instead of one generic “NFC passed” result.