MRZ and chip access
MRZ data can participate in access derivation/protocols depending on the eMRTD. Public documentation does not infer BAC/PACE support without an implementation source.
PLATFORM · CHECKID
ePassport & eMRTD
Electronic passports/eMRTDs with MRZ, NFC and correctly scoped ICAO Doc 9303 concepts.
CAPABILITYInput → Processing → Output
CONTROLPolicy · risk · standard
EVIDENCEResult · trace · scope
TECHNICAL REFERENCE
ePassport/eMRTD: ICAO trust chain rather than OCR-only
MRZ/access → LDS/DG → SOD hash → DSC → CSCA trust → holder binding
LDS and Data Groups
DG1 commonly carries biographic/MRZ data and DG2 the facial image in the ICAO LDS context. Other DGs are described only when the implementation uses them.
SOD integrity
The SOD carries signed security data/hash references used to validate Data Group integrity. Reading a DG successfully is not equivalent to successful Passive Authentication.
DSC / CSCA trust
Passive Authentication requires validation of the document signer certificate/trust chain to a CSCA/trust anchor according to trust-store policy. Public documentation does not claim ICAO PKD participation without evidence.
AA / CA
Active Authentication and Chip Authentication are separate mechanisms and are published only when the reader/backend implementation supports them.
Holder binding
After chip/document trust, live-biometric holder binding is a separate step. Evidence should distinguish chip integrity/trust results from face comparison/PAD results.